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03.12.10

Yet another Texas Family Code 102.003(a)(9) case….

I can’t get enough of these standing cases. In re M.K.S.-V., 301 S.W.3d 460, Tex.App.-Dallas, 2009. Facts as reported from the case:

K.V. and T.S. met in the fall of 1997 and began living together in late 1998. The two talked about rearing a child together and in mid-2003, after the two had received counseling, T.S. became pregnant with M.K.S. through artificial insemination by a sperm donor. T.S. delivered M.K.S. on May 21, 2004 and co-parented M.K.S. with K.V. until August 3, 2005 when the relationship ended and T.S. moved out with M.K.S. Because T.S. and K.V. wanted to maintain some continuity for the child, they agreed on a schedule allowing K.V. regular access to and possession of the child. Under the agreement, M.K.S. would visit K.V. overnight once a week, alternate Sunday afternoons, and on alternate weekends beginning on Friday afternoons during the school year. During the summer, the weekend visits would sometimes start on Thursday afternoon. M.K.S. also visited K.V. on “some holidays.” This schedule began August 5, 2005 and continued until April 25, 2007 when T.S. discontinued the visits because K.V. had accessed M.K.S.’s school record against T.S.’s “directive.” The following month, K.V. filed suit seeking to be appointed joint managing conservator of M.K.S. or, in the alternative, to adopt her.

I recall this case getting some media attention because the parties were lesbian lovers. Interesting to note the Court did not mention this fact in the entire case. Unlike most cases the parties here had an actual written possession schedule they generally seemed to follow yet TS maintained that KV had no standing. The appeals court found that in this case, the possession agreement between the parties shared characteristics of a standard possession order, MKS had her own room at KV’s house, KV had toys for MKS, KV would pick the child up from school when she was sick, KV was listed as a parent at the school for pick up purposes, and similar parental duties, actions and obligations that are indicative of being a parent. The found that the record did not suggest the possession and care giving was intended to be a temporary arrangement. For these reasons the appeals court remanded the case and found error when the trial court dismissed KV’s claims. Remanded.

03.06.10

San Antonio Court of Appeals breaks from tradition on 102.003(a)(9) Standing

For some reason I find these standing cases super interesting. The analysis almost always focuses on ‘what exactly makes you a parent’ is fascinating to me.

In re Y.B. 300 S.W.3d 1

Here are the facts as reported from the case: Swift and Tina Bruno have known each other for over ten years. In December of 2004, Bruno traveled to the Ukraine to adopt three girls. Bruno is the girls’ only legal parent. On April 22, 2007, Swift and Bruno married. On January 21, 2008, Swift moved out of Bruno’s house. He filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”) on March 10, 2008. A week later, Bruno filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, challenging Swift’s standing to bring a SAPCR. Conflicting testimony was presented regarding whether Swift met the requisite amount of time required to establish standing under the Family Code. The trial court granted Bruno’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, and awarded Bruno $4,000 in attorney’s fees. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that Swift did not have actual care, control, and possession of the children for at least six months. The trial court concluded that Swift lacked standing under section 102.003(a)(9) of the Family Code to bring a SAPCR. Swift now appeals.

The majority held the Trial Court erred by dismissing the lawsuit because Swift raised a fact issue on whether he is and was in fact a parent.

Justice Rebecca Simmons filed a dissenting opinion. She felt “At best, the evidence shows Swift lived in Bruno’s home for approximately nine months. According to Swift, he would: sometimes put cereal out for the children in the morning; eat dinner with the family; drive the children to school; help with homework; take the children fishing; bath the youngest child; and the girls called him “Daddy.” Justice Simmons felt these activities are typical of those undertaken by stepparents and felt the majority’s broad interpretation of 102.003 would give almost anyone involved with children for more than six months standing to file SAPCR. Justice Simmons cites, Troxel as a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for their children as well as In the Interest of M.J.G. 248 S.W.3d 753 where the grandparents of MJG had a heck of a lot more involvement with the children than Swift had with YB and the Motion to Strike was granted in the MJG case. Based on the evidence in this case there was no fact issue because there were no facts establishing Swift mad any decisions at all concerning the health, education and welfare under the M.J.G. standard. Seems like Justice Simmons got it right. Under the majority’s standard, almost anyone would qualify for standing because the burden to create a fact issue on this is so low.

03.06.10

Texas Attorney General attempts to stop divorce

As reported by the ABA, the Attorney General of Texas intervened in a divorce case involving a same-sex couple. It appears the Attorney General’s position is that since Texas doesn’t recognize a same-sex marriage (from Massachusetts) it is not possible to legally end the marital relationship. Texas has a voter-approved state constitutional amendment not recognizing same-marriage and the Texas Family Code prohibits same-sex marriages or civil unions. If there is no valid legal marriage, then there would be nothing to adjudicate or determine. Stay tuned, this issue has already come up in Dallas and is headed for the Court of Appeals with probable review by the Texas Supreme Court.

03.05.10

Taking Child to Church Could Land You in Jail

As reported by the ABA Journal

In a surprising move by a Cook County Circuit Court, a father could be held in contempt of court for taking his daughter to Church in violation of a Court Order that requires her to only be exposed to Judaism.  Oral arguments are expected today.

03.04.10

Important Winter Safety Tips

The following is a guest blog article by Dolan Law Offices:

Winter’s not quite over yet and for much of the country this season has been far from a winter wonderland.  In fact, the Associated Press is reporting that 49 out of the 50 states had snow during the month of February – Hawaii being the lone holdout.

While many of us long for the warmth of summer, it is important that we remain vigilant to the dangers that winter brings with it.  Until the spring flowers emerge, we should all remember the following winter safety tips to avoid serious personal injuries:

  • Slow Down: whether you are driving or walking – slow down. Speed is a common reason for accidents during the winter months when feet and tires can easily give way to slippery conditions.
  • Winterize Your Car: prepare your car for winter travel by having a mechanic check all of the fluids and making sure that you have the right tires on your car.  A properly winterized car can avoid help you avoid accidents.
  • Clean Ice and Snow from Your Vehicle: clean all of the ice and snow off of your car – including all of your windows and the hood, trunk and roof of your car.  If ice or snow slips off of your car while you’re driving and hits the windshield it can cause a serious accident.
  • Wear a Helmet for Outdoor Sports: a helmet can help avoid traumatic brain injuries when worn during winter sports such as skiing, ice skating and sledding.  Choose a helmet that fits you well and will protect you in a fall or collision.
  • Choose Safe Sledding and Skating Spots: Be careful where you choose to enjoy winter sports. If you are ice skating make sure that the ice is thoroughly frozen and safe for skating.  If you are sledding be careful to avoid trees, cars, and other people.
  • Be Careful with Your Snowblower: snowblowers cause serious injuries, including amputations, every year.  Never leave the machine running or put your hands near the chute.
  • Take Care of Your Property: sidewalks, walkways and driveways can become slippery with just a slight coating of snow, sleet or ice.  Be sure to promptly remove any accumulating snow and to properly sand and salt the paved (and concrete) areas of your property so that people do not slip and fall.

We hope that these tips help keep you safe – both from injury and potential liability.

This post by Dolan Law Offices, P.C. a firm of Illinois truck accident attorneys.

01.06.10

Ne Exeat Clause Reviewed by the United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari (I was unable to find a copy of the Order as of the drafting of this article) in the case Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081. This interesting case involves the interpretation of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction for purposes of whether a ‘Ne Exeat’ confers a right of custody for purposes of the Hague Convention. A Ne Exeat clause is the generic term used by Courts and Lawyers for a clause in custody agreements that prohibits one parent from removing the child from the child’s home country without the other parent’s consent. Apparently the Abbott’s had such a clause in their custody and conservatorship order. The Hague Convention (the child custody portion) requires that once a child has been removed from his or her home country that to be eligible for return back to the home country the parent requesting the return must have “rights of custody’ which include ‘the right to determine the child’s place of residence’ Mr. Abbott argues the Ne Exeat clause in his custody order grants such a right. Ms. Abbott disagrees. The Federal Court of Appeals are split on this issue the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

Here are the background facts of the Abbott’s:

Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, married respondent Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott, a U.S. citizen, in England in 1992. Their son A.J. was born 1995. Sometime in 1998, the Abbotts moved to Chile, where Mr. Abbott had accepted a new job.

The Abbott’s separated in March 2003. Litigation in the Chilean family courts produced various court orders. The first, entered in January 2004, granted Mr. Abbott “direct and regular” visitation rights. The second, entered in November 2004, left daily care and control of A.J. with the Ms. Abbott. The third, entered in February 2005, expanded Mr. Abbott’s visitation rights to include a full month of summer vacation. The fourth, entered on January 13, 2004, prohibited both parents from removing A.J. from Chile without written authorization from the court. In addition to the Chilean family court ne exeat order, petitioner also held a ne exeat right under a Chilean statute that requires authorization from a parent having visitation rights before the other parent may take a child out of Chile.

In July 2005, Mr. Abbott sought an order from Chilean courts that would have expanded his rights with respect to his son. Shortly thereafter, in August 2005, Ms. Abbott took A.J. out of Chile without Mr. Abbott’s knowledge or the court’s consent. Mr. Abbott hired a private investigator and, four months after the removal, located his son in Texas.

Mr. Abbott filed suit in federal district court in Texas, seeking to have his son returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention. The district court denied Mr. Abbott’s request. The court concluded that the removal was not “wrongful” within the meaning of the Hague Convention because Mr. Abbott’s ne exeat right did not constitute a right of custody under the Convention.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the other Federal Circuit Court were divided;

- the Second Circuit held that ne exeat doesn’t create a custody right. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001)

- the Eleventh Circuit held that ne exeat did create a custody right. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004)

My guess is that the Supreme’s will hold it does not, by itself, create a custody right. The Chilean custody order clearly gives the mother the superior custody right – the right to determine the primary residence of the child. The Hague Convention specifically differentiates between ‘custody rights’ and ‘visitation rights” My sense is that unlike in the United States where our laws are designed to create and encourage a post-separation coparenting environment, that most of the other countries opt for a custody arrangement whereby one parent has the majority of the parenting rights and the noncustodial parent’s rights are relegated inferior to those of the custodial parent. If you take the literal meaning of the Hague Convention on this issue I think it is a stretch to hold otherwise. Presumably, the other signatory countries, besides the United States, signed and ratified the treaty because it’s congruent with their ideas and beliefs about post divorce and post separation child rearing. To hold otherwise would not only confer rights to Mr. Abbott he specifically did not have, it could have the unintended effect of having signatory countries deratify the treaty.

12.13.09

New and Interesting Cases from the Texas Court of Appeals: Week of December 13th, 2009

A new case on Intentional Under Employment out of Dallas. In the Interest of J.G.L., a Child, 295 S.W.3d 424. The background facts are as follows: After a bench trial, the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Judge David Hanchen, entered a final decree of divorce in which the court deviated from child support guidelines on the basis that husband was voluntarily underemployed. Husband appealed. The trial court found that Husband’s monthly net resources were $4,779.90 in 2006, and $3,393.40 in 2007. The court further found Husband was obligated to support two children, one before the court and another from a previous marriage. The divorce decree shows the Texas Family Code guidelines direct child support payments of $593.77 per month based upon Husband’s 2007 monthly net resources. The court, however, found that “testimony shows that the obligor was voluntarily underemployed during 2007” and set child support payments at $825 per month. Based upon these findings, the trial court awarded Wife child support payments of $825 per month.

The Texas Family Code requires courts to make specific findings if “the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.130(a)(3) (Vernon 2008). Trial courts must provide “specific reasons” for the variance between the child support percentage guidelines and the child support awarded. Id. § 154.130(b)(5). Otherwise, the law presumes the guideline child support payments are in the best interest of the child. Id. § 154.123(a) (Vernon 2008). A finding of voluntary underemployment, for example, allows the court to set child support at the “earning potential” rather than the actual earnings of the child support obligor. Id. § 154.066 (Vernon 2008).

To begin the voluntary underemployment analysis, the trial court contemplates the obligor’s proof of current wages. In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627; see also Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); DuBois v. DuBois, 956 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1997, no pet.). Once the obligor’s wages are established, the burden shifts to the obligee to demonstrate the obligor’s intent to decrease income for the purpose of reducing child support payments. In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627. Evidence of intent, such as the circumstances of obligor’s education, economic adversities, business reversals, business background, and earning potential, gives rise to an inference of voluntary underemployment. In re P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d at 405-06; see also In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627. These factors, however, are not exhaustive. Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 454 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); see, e.g., Garner, 200 S.W.3d at 303 (where the trial court considered the gifts and financial support of the obligor’s extended family in determining his net resources).

Husband’s argument rests on his testimony and that of his employer, Lance McDade. McDade stated that by agreement Husband set his own schedule and did not work every day. He further testified that he assigned Husband’s projects and that Husband received a forty percent commission from the profits. McDade told the trial court that Husband earned $62,730 in 2005, $76,900 in 2006, and $54,300 in 2007. When asked about the earnings decline between 2006 and 2007, McDade indicated that he reduced Husband’s workload based on Husband’s emotional state and that his business decreased overall because of adverse economic conditions. He testified Husband did not ask for a reduction of his workload, and that he subsequently asked McDade to increase it. Husband told the court that in 2007 his income decreased more than the income of the business overall because McDade would assign more work in the downturn to those employees with lower commission percentages. There was is no evidence to the contrary.

Wife basically argued that Husband is incorrect that she must provide evidence of intentional underemployment and that the Court has discretion to weigh the testimony of the witness and other evidence. The Appeals Court cited In re P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d at 405-06 that established Wife had the burden at trial to present evidence of underemployment as a specific basis for departing from child support guidelines

Wife relies on In re A.B.A.T.W., 266 S.W.3d 580 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.), to demonstrate that Husband and McDade’s testimony created conflicting evidence which allowed the trial court to make a determination of Husband’s intent. However, in this case the Court found Wife neither testified nor provided other evidence to contradict Husband’s and his employers testimony about Husband’s intent to earn income. The Appeals Court conceded that although the Trial Court was not required to accept the testimony of Husband and his employer as true, the trial Courts rejection of that testimony as not credible would still leave the trial court without any evidence that Husband intended to work less in order to reduce child support payments and presumably that would be an abuse of discretion because there would be no evidence at all of any intentional underemployment. Presumably, if the mother had a chance to respond to the Court of Appeals she would argue that if the Court found the employee/employer testimony not credible regarding why there was a reduction in income then the Trial Court was free to presume other reasons, like intentional underemployment, could be attributed to the drop in income. Again presumably, the Court of Appeals would respond that inconsistent testimony alone regarding a drop in income is not a “specific reason” under the Family Code. The Court remanded the case to set child support according the guidelines.

11.12.09

New and Interesting Cases in the Texas Court of Appeals

In re Columbia Medical Center, of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) – Interesting Texas Supreme Court case from a practitioner’s point of view for Motions for New Trials. The back ground facts are as follows: Read the rest of this entry »

10.11.09

Changes to the Texas Standard Possession Order (HB 1012)

Under the presumptive possession schedule set up by the Texas Legislature, the non-custodial parents weekend period of possession extends an extra day if the child school schedule has either Monday or Friday as a student holiday. Unfortunately, most school districts do not use the terms “holiday” and there are typically different terms that address days off for both students and teachers. Read the rest of this entry »

09.22.09

Goodbye Economic Contribution and Offsetting Benefits – Hello Texas Family Code 3.402

A common question I come across in my practice is when marital property and salaries have been used to pay the mortgage on a house the other spouse owned prior to marriage. Read the rest of this entry »