March 3rd, 2011: Mr. Granata successfully obtained a Temporary Restraining Order after it was found the other parent had injured the child by appearantly biting the child on the arm. Based on the Judge’s comments upon reviewing the application as drafted by Mr. Granata, opposing counsel agreed to a temporary permanent injunction.

March 4th, 2011: Mr. Granata successfully negotiated a shared and split custody arrangement for his client, who is the father of the children. Client also gets to determine the school district the children go to.

March 11, 2011: (Non-Family Law) Mr. Granata successfully obtained over a 50% rent abatement for a client who was experiencing unclean water due to a langlords failure to properly maintain plumbing and heating in the house.

Edit: I called around and located one of the drafting lawyer’s of this bill (who happens to also be a close friend of mine and whom I didn’t even know was working on this) and he shared with me they went through multiple iterations of this bill prior to it even going to committee. Appearantly there was an actual schedule on the table being proposed for this bill for children at different ages (1-6 months old, 7-12 months old, 13 -24 months, ect…) but it was ultimately overulled by various interest groups. It’s sort of a shame since it seems like you have to litigate all possession schedules for children younger than three because there is no presumptive schedule. It’s a legal free-for-all. Custody litigation almost always polarizes the parents against each other and makes it difficult for parents of young children to start out on a nonadversarial footing from the very beginning of trying to jointly raise a child. I think this is a disservice to Texas parents.

By:AAThompson

H.B. No. 1262

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED

AN ACT relating to a court order for the possession of or access to a child under three years of age.

 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:

SECTIONA1.AASection 153.254, Family Code, is amended to read

as follows: A CHILD LESS THAN THREE YEARS OF AGE.

 (a) The court shall render an order appropriate under the circumstances for possession of a child less than three years of age. In rendering the order, the court shall consider evidence of all relevant factors, including:

      (1) the caregiving provided to the child before and during the current suit;

      (2) the effect on the child that may result from separation from either party;

      (3) the availability of the parties as caregivers and the willingness of the parties to personally care for the child;

      (4) the physical, medical, behavioral, and developmental needs of the child;

      (5) the physical, medical, emotional, economic, and social conditions of the parties;

      (6) the impact and influence of individuals, other than the parties, who will be present during periods of possession;

      (7) the presence of siblings during periods of possession;

      (8) the child’s need to develop healthy attachments to both parents;

      (9) the child’s need for continuity of routine;

      (10) the location and proximity of the residences of the parties;

      (11) the need for a temporary possession schedule that incrementally shifts to the schedule provided in the prospective order under Subsection (d) based on:

            (A) the age of the child; or

            (B) minimal or inconsistent contact with the child by a party;

      (12) the ability of the parties to share in the responsibilities, rights, and duties of parenting; and

      (13) any other evidence of the best interest of the child.

(b) Notwithstanding the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, in rendering an order under Subsection (a), the court shall make findings in support of the order if:

      (1) a party files a written request with the court not later than the 10th day after the date of the hearing; or

      (2) a party makes an oral request in court during the hearing on the order.

     (c) The court shall make and enter the findings required by Subsection (b) not later than the 15th day after the date the party makes the request.

 (d) The court shall render a prospective order to take effect on the child’s third birthday, which presumptively will be the standard possession order.

 SECTION 2. The enactment of this Act does not constitute a material and substantial change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of a court order or portion of a decree that provides for the possession of or access to a child rendered before the effective date of this Act.

 SECTIONA 3. The change in law made by this Act applies to a suit affecting the parent-child relationship that is pending in a trial court on the effective date of this Act or that is filed on or after the effective date of this Act.

 SECTION 4. This Act takes effect September 1, 2011.

H.B.ANo.A1262

January 6^th 2011: successfully defended opposing party’s Motion requesting to cover the health insurance of the parties’ child. The child has a significant medical history of serious medical illnesses. The non-custodial parent also had an inconsistent employment history where gaps in health insurance were likely.

November 5th 2010: Mr. Granata successfully upwardly adjusted the opposing sides child support and back dated it over 8 months.

November 12th 2010: Adoption successfully granted after a child fled gang related violence from his home country and came into the United States via Central America and had his maternal aunt adopt him to begin immigration procedures for his residency.

December 13th 2010: Successfully mediated a high conflict custody case whereby all requested relief by the opposing party was denied.

March 23 2010: Mr. Granata’s client awarded more than Standard Possession from the custodial parent based on concerns by the Court about the custodial parent’s exaggerated claims about the non-custodial parent.

April 19^th 2010: With the help of expert testimony via a cultural anthropologist that due to significant and long standing parental conflict between the parents that parental termination would be in the best interests of the child. Court agreed and approved the termination.

July 9^th2010: Mr. Granata’s client awarded primary custody back after it was demonstrated to the Court that a 2 year joint physical custody arrangement with the other parent was not working. Court agreed and awarded Mr. Granata’s client primary custody.

August 4^th 2010: Opposing party requested supervised visitation and reduced visitation for Mr. Granata’s client. Court denied the request.

August 5^th2010: Mr. Granata successfully altered the opposing party’s visitation. The opposing party wanted to spontaneously begin visiting the children after having no visits for over a year. Court agreed and changed the noncustodial parent’s access from Standard Possession.

August 19th 2010: Mr. Granata’s client awarded multiple thousands of dollars in prepaid child support even though the other party (by agreement) has primary physical custody.

August 24^th2010: Mr. Granata hired on as local counsel for multi-state custody and property litigation divorce.

September 19^th2010: Mr. Granata successfully blocked two attempts to register and enforce an out of state custody order based on improper procedure by the other side.

October 1^st 2010: Disabled father was awarded joint physical and legal custody of his two children plus receives child and spousal support.

darrel_doc1 (2)

K.V. and T.S. met in the fall of 1997 and began living together in late 1998. The two talked about rearing a child together and in mid-2003, after the two had received counseling, T.S. became pregnant with M.K.S. through artificial insemination by a sperm donor. T.S. delivered M.K.S. on May 21, 2004 and co-parented M.K.S. with K.V. until August 3, 2005 when the relationship ended and T.S. moved out with M.K.S. Because T.S. and K.V. wanted to maintain some continuity for the child, they agreed on a schedule allowing K.V. regular access to and possession of the child. Under the agreement, M.K.S. would visit K.V. overnight once a week, alternate Sunday afternoons, and on alternate weekends beginning on Friday afternoons during the school year. During the summer, the weekend visits would sometimes start on Thursday afternoon. M.K.S. also visited K.V. on “some holidays.” This schedule began August 5, 2005 and continued until April 25, 2007 when T.S. discontinued the visits because K.V. had accessed M.K.S.’s school record against T.S.’s “directive.” The following month, K.V. filed suit seeking to be appointed joint managing conservator of M.K.S. or, in the alternative, to adopt her.

I recall this case getting some media attention because the parties were lesbian lovers. Interesting to note the Court did not mention this fact in the entire case. Unlike most cases the parties here had an actual written possession schedule they generally seemed to follow yet TS maintained that KV had no standing. The appeals court found that in this case, the possession agreement between the parties shared characteristics of a standard possession order, MKS had her own room at KV’s house, KV had toys for MKS, KV would pick the child up from school when she was sick, KV was listed as a parent at the school for pick up purposes, and similar parental duties, actions and obligations that are indicative of being a parent. The found that the record did not suggest the possession and care giving was intended to be a temporary arrangement. For these reasons the appeals court remanded the case and found error when the trial court dismissed KV’s claims. Remanded.

Monthly meetings always include the case law update.

Section meetings are the 2nd Wednesday of every month at noon (except August).



In re Y.B. 300 S.W.3d 1

Here are the facts as reported from the case: Swift and Tina Bruno have known each other for over ten years. In December of 2004, Bruno traveled to the Ukraine to adopt three girls. Bruno is the girls’ only legal parent. On April 22, 2007, Swift and Bruno married. On January 21, 2008, Swift moved out of Bruno’s house. He filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”) on March 10, 2008. A week later, Bruno filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, challenging Swift’s standing to bring a SAPCR. Conflicting testimony was presented regarding whether Swift met the requisite amount of time required to establish standing under the Family Code. The trial court granted Bruno’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to dismiss, and awarded Bruno $4,000 in attorney’s fees. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that Swift did not have actual care, control, and possession of the children for at least six months. The trial court concluded that Swift lacked standing under section 102.003(a)(9) of the Family Code to bring a SAPCR. Swift now appeals.

The majority held the Trial Court erred by dismissing the lawsuit because Swift raised a fact issue on whether he is and was in fact a parent.

Justice Rebecca Simmons filed a dissenting opinion. She felt “At best, the evidence shows Swift lived in Bruno’s home for approximately nine months. According to Swift, he would: sometimes put cereal out for the children in the morning; eat dinner with the family; drive the children to school; help with homework; take the children fishing; bath the youngest child; and the girls called him “Daddy.” Justice Simmons felt these activities are typical of those undertaken by stepparents and felt the majority’s broad interpretation of 102.003 would give almost anyone involved with children for more than six months standing to file SAPCR. Justice Simmons cites, Troxel as a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions for their children as well as In the Interest of M.J.G. 248 S.W.3d 753 where the grandparents of MJG had a heck of a lot more involvement with the children than Swift had with YB and the Motion to Strike was granted in the MJG case. Based on the evidence in this case there was no fact issue because there were no facts establishing Swift mad any decisions at all concerning the health, education and welfare under the M.J.G. standard. Seems like Justice Simmons got it right. Under the majority’s standard, almost anyone would qualify for standing because the burden to create a fact issue on this is so low.