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01.06.10

Ne Exeat Clause Reviewed by the United States Supreme Court

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari (I was unable to find a copy of the Order as of the drafting of this article) in the case Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081. This interesting case involves the interpretation of the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction for purposes of whether a ‘Ne Exeat’ confers a right of custody for purposes of the Hague Convention. A Ne Exeat clause is the generic term used by Courts and Lawyers for a clause in custody agreements that prohibits one parent from removing the child from the child’s home country without the other parent’s consent. Apparently the Abbott’s had such a clause in their custody and conservatorship order. The Hague Convention (the child custody portion) requires that once a child has been removed from his or her home country that to be eligible for return back to the home country the parent requesting the return must have “rights of custody’ which include ‘the right to determine the child’s place of residence’ Mr. Abbott argues the Ne Exeat clause in his custody order grants such a right. Ms. Abbott disagrees. The Federal Court of Appeals are split on this issue the U.S. Supreme Court granted review.

Here are the background facts of the Abbott’s:

Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, married respondent Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott, a U.S. citizen, in England in 1992. Their son A.J. was born 1995. Sometime in 1998, the Abbotts moved to Chile, where Mr. Abbott had accepted a new job.

The Abbott’s separated in March 2003. Litigation in the Chilean family courts produced various court orders. The first, entered in January 2004, granted Mr. Abbott “direct and regular” visitation rights. The second, entered in November 2004, left daily care and control of A.J. with the Ms. Abbott. The third, entered in February 2005, expanded Mr. Abbott’s visitation rights to include a full month of summer vacation. The fourth, entered on January 13, 2004, prohibited both parents from removing A.J. from Chile without written authorization from the court. In addition to the Chilean family court ne exeat order, petitioner also held a ne exeat right under a Chilean statute that requires authorization from a parent having visitation rights before the other parent may take a child out of Chile.

In July 2005, Mr. Abbott sought an order from Chilean courts that would have expanded his rights with respect to his son. Shortly thereafter, in August 2005, Ms. Abbott took A.J. out of Chile without Mr. Abbott’s knowledge or the court’s consent. Mr. Abbott hired a private investigator and, four months after the removal, located his son in Texas.

Mr. Abbott filed suit in federal district court in Texas, seeking to have his son returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention. The district court denied Mr. Abbott’s request. The court concluded that the removal was not “wrongful” within the meaning of the Hague Convention because Mr. Abbott’s ne exeat right did not constitute a right of custody under the Convention.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the other Federal Circuit Court were divided;

- the Second Circuit held that ne exeat doesn’t create a custody right. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 949 (2001)

- the Eleventh Circuit held that ne exeat did create a custody right. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978 (2004)

My guess is that the Supreme’s will hold it does not, by itself, create a custody right. The Chilean custody order clearly gives the mother the superior custody right – the right to determine the primary residence of the child. The Hague Convention specifically differentiates between ‘custody rights’ and ‘visitation rights” My sense is that unlike in the United States where our laws are designed to create and encourage a post-separation coparenting environment, that most of the other countries opt for a custody arrangement whereby one parent has the majority of the parenting rights and the noncustodial parent’s rights are relegated inferior to those of the custodial parent. If you take the literal meaning of the Hague Convention on this issue I think it is a stretch to hold otherwise. Presumably, the other signatory countries, besides the United States, signed and ratified the treaty because it’s congruent with their ideas and beliefs about post divorce and post separation child rearing. To hold otherwise would not only confer rights to Mr. Abbott he specifically did not have, it could have the unintended effect of having signatory countries deratify the treaty.

12.13.09

New and Interesting Cases from the Texas Court of Appeals: Week of December 13th, 2009

A new case on Intentional Under Employment out of Dallas. In the Interest of J.G.L., a Child, 295 S.W.3d 424. The background facts are as follows: After a bench trial, the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Judge David Hanchen, entered a final decree of divorce in which the court deviated from child support guidelines on the basis that husband was voluntarily underemployed. Husband appealed. The trial court found that Husband’s monthly net resources were $4,779.90 in 2006, and $3,393.40 in 2007. The court further found Husband was obligated to support two children, one before the court and another from a previous marriage. The divorce decree shows the Texas Family Code guidelines direct child support payments of $593.77 per month based upon Husband’s 2007 monthly net resources. The court, however, found that “testimony shows that the obligor was voluntarily underemployed during 2007” and set child support payments at $825 per month. Based upon these findings, the trial court awarded Wife child support payments of $825 per month.

The Texas Family Code requires courts to make specific findings if “the amount of child support ordered by the court varies from the amount computed by applying the percentage guidelines.” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 154.130(a)(3) (Vernon 2008). Trial courts must provide “specific reasons” for the variance between the child support percentage guidelines and the child support awarded. Id. § 154.130(b)(5). Otherwise, the law presumes the guideline child support payments are in the best interest of the child. Id. § 154.123(a) (Vernon 2008). A finding of voluntary underemployment, for example, allows the court to set child support at the “earning potential” rather than the actual earnings of the child support obligor. Id. § 154.066 (Vernon 2008).

To begin the voluntary underemployment analysis, the trial court contemplates the obligor’s proof of current wages. In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627; see also Zorilla v. Wahid, 83 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); DuBois v. DuBois, 956 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1997, no pet.). Once the obligor’s wages are established, the burden shifts to the obligee to demonstrate the obligor’s intent to decrease income for the purpose of reducing child support payments. In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627. Evidence of intent, such as the circumstances of obligor’s education, economic adversities, business reversals, business background, and earning potential, gives rise to an inference of voluntary underemployment. In re P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d at 405-06; see also In re K.N.C., 276 S.W.3d at 627. These factors, however, are not exhaustive. Roosth v. Roosth, 889 S.W.2d 445, 454 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied); see, e.g., Garner, 200 S.W.3d at 303 (where the trial court considered the gifts and financial support of the obligor’s extended family in determining his net resources).

Husband’s argument rests on his testimony and that of his employer, Lance McDade. McDade stated that by agreement Husband set his own schedule and did not work every day. He further testified that he assigned Husband’s projects and that Husband received a forty percent commission from the profits. McDade told the trial court that Husband earned $62,730 in 2005, $76,900 in 2006, and $54,300 in 2007. When asked about the earnings decline between 2006 and 2007, McDade indicated that he reduced Husband’s workload based on Husband’s emotional state and that his business decreased overall because of adverse economic conditions. He testified Husband did not ask for a reduction of his workload, and that he subsequently asked McDade to increase it. Husband told the court that in 2007 his income decreased more than the income of the business overall because McDade would assign more work in the downturn to those employees with lower commission percentages. There was is no evidence to the contrary.

Wife basically argued that Husband is incorrect that she must provide evidence of intentional underemployment and that the Court has discretion to weigh the testimony of the witness and other evidence. The Appeals Court cited In re P.J.H., 25 S.W.3d at 405-06 that established Wife had the burden at trial to present evidence of underemployment as a specific basis for departing from child support guidelines

Wife relies on In re A.B.A.T.W., 266 S.W.3d 580 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.), to demonstrate that Husband and McDade’s testimony created conflicting evidence which allowed the trial court to make a determination of Husband’s intent. However, in this case the Court found Wife neither testified nor provided other evidence to contradict Husband’s and his employers testimony about Husband’s intent to earn income. The Appeals Court conceded that although the Trial Court was not required to accept the testimony of Husband and his employer as true, the trial Courts rejection of that testimony as not credible would still leave the trial court without any evidence that Husband intended to work less in order to reduce child support payments and presumably that would be an abuse of discretion because there would be no evidence at all of any intentional underemployment. Presumably, if the mother had a chance to respond to the Court of Appeals she would argue that if the Court found the employee/employer testimony not credible regarding why there was a reduction in income then the Trial Court was free to presume other reasons, like intentional underemployment, could be attributed to the drop in income. Again presumably, the Court of Appeals would respond that inconsistent testimony alone regarding a drop in income is not a “specific reason” under the Family Code. The Court remanded the case to set child support according the guidelines.

11.12.09

New and Interesting Cases in the Texas Court of Appeals

In re Columbia Medical Center, of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) – Interesting Texas Supreme Court case from a practitioner’s point of view for Motions for New Trials. The back ground facts are as follows: Read the rest of this entry »

10.11.09

Changes to the Texas Standard Possession Order (HB 1012)

Under the presumptive possession schedule set up by the Texas Legislature, the non-custodial parents weekend period of possession extends an extra day if the child school schedule has either Monday or Friday as a student holiday. Unfortunately, most school districts do not use the terms “holiday” and there are typically different terms that address days off for both students and teachers. Read the rest of this entry »

09.22.09

Goodbye Economic Contribution and Offsetting Benefits – Hello Texas Family Code 3.402

A common question I come across in my practice is when marital property and salaries have been used to pay the mortgage on a house the other spouse owned prior to marriage. Read the rest of this entry »

09.17.09

In re Lay Wah – Correct Application of the Law but Probably a Bad Result

This is a case where application of the rules (which is always the correct thing to do) produced a bad result for the kids and demonstrates the problem when children from non-Hague countries are part of the litigation. In re Lay Wah, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2009 WL 2152565 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet. h.) Here is the quick facts: Father is a U.S. citizen born in Taiwan. Mother is not a U.S. citizen, and was born in Singapore. They were residents of Beijing when they married in Las Vegas in 1997. Read the rest of this entry »

09.11.09

Remembering 9/11/2001

Saying a prayer to those who rushed to aid and to those who walked through the Valley of Death on 9.11.2001

Rest In Peace Noell…friend, teammate, fraternity brother…http://www.legacy.com/gb2/default.aspx?bookID=146244

09.10.09

Texas Decides to Abolish Children’s Choices

As noted in my article on the Legislative updates from the 2009 legislative session a child’s written preference of the parent that child would like to designate primary residence is gone. I think it’s important to note they did away with written preference but a child’s stated preference is still relevant to a best interest analysis. Read the rest of this entry »

09.04.09

N.Y. Appeals Court Fires Lawyer Who Never Met 11-Year-Old Client

Saying that an attorney’s representation of an 11-year-old client in a family law matter did not comply with court administrative and legal ethics rules, a New York appellate court fired the attorney and ordered that new counsel be appointed for the youth. Read the rest of this entry »

09.04.09

New Website! – dallasdivorcelawyer.com

We are proud to announce the launch of our new website by PaperStreet Web Design!  Our new site has more information on our areas of practice, contact information, our new blog for continuous firm updates and much more.  Feel free to explore our new website, and don’t forget to bookmark us so you can come back and read our blog periodically!